Third Wittgenstein

The works cited here discuss the theme of 'Third Wittgenstein'.

Hutto, Daniel D., Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy: Neither Theory nor Therapy, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003 (2nd ed. 2006).

Book information:
Paperback, 296 pages

Brief Discussion
There are a number of fundamental topics, including 'reality', 'meaning' and 'logic', that cannot be dealt with properly without an appropriate understanding of the end and limits of philosophy. In this book, Daniel D. Hutto draws on Wittgenstein's insights on how we must approach these topics to challenge the idea that we face a simple methodological choice in philosophy: to advance theory or to attempt therapy. Consideration of these topics tells against the prevalent opinion that philosophy is a kind of theorising, scientific or otherwise. Yet, this should not lead us to think that its business is purely therapeutic, designed to help rid us of such ambitions and attendant confusions. It is possible to deny that philosophy is progressive, according the standard conception, while also denyimg that it is wholly negative and deflationary. The author explores this third way by expounding, explicating and defending Wittgenstein's claim that philosophy clarifies our understanding of important philsophical matters.
Page where this work is discussed:
Book review of this book: The European Legacy, Vol. 12, No. 7, pp. 891–928, 2007;

Hutto, Daniel D., "Voices to be Heard", The British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 13(1) 2005: 149-161.

Brief Discussion
This is a detailed book discussion of the book The Voices of Wittgenstein. According to Hutto: 'The Voices of Wittgenstein is an absolutely fascinating collection. It presents us with dictations by
Wittgenstein and a series of other writings with his imprint solidly upon them; all of which were compiled and arranged by Waismann. Despite Wittgenstein’s wanting to reject ‘many, many’ of the formulations of his early work, Waismann sought to ‘emphasize the compatibility and continuity’ of his developing ideas with those of the Tractatus. As he was partially under Schlick’s direction, this should hardly be surprising given the central importance of the Tractatus to the logical empiricist programme. Moreover, without modifying its dictated content he rearranged the material to present it a more orderly manner - bringing together related but otherwise disparate remarks. Also, going against Wittgenstein’s grain,
this was partly an attempt to impose a global structure upon the discussions. […] upon turning the final page perhaps we are still left with no final means of deciding debates, particularly as we cannot say exactly how much of this is Wittgenstein and how much Waismann. We are forced to assess the ideas on their own merits and perhaps, at best, see how well they tie up with and reflect what we already
know of Wittgenstein’s writings. Baker is surely right to think that this collection will, ‘help one to hear voices which are already there to be heard in many other [of Wittgenstein’s] texts as well’ (p. xxxviii). I believe that listening out for these voices, and perhaps rethinking some of the standard ways of receiving his work, will yield promising results. The links appear very strong and speak in favour of Wittgenstein’s considerable influence on these writings. Or to put it another way, this reviewer was left with the thought: I don’t know if it is Wittgenstein, but I like it.'

Hutto, Daniel D., "Two Wittgensteins Too Many: Wittgenstein’s Foundationalism" in The Third Wittgenstein, Moyal-Sharrock, D. (ed.) Ashgate 2004: 25-41.
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Brief Discussion
Hutto discusses the view that there are a radical breaks in the continuity of Wittgenstein's thought (from the earlier to the later). He concludes: 'Wittgenstein’s central insight, early and late, is that there can be no transcendental setting of limits to sense in advance, or once and for all. It is for this reason that philosophers go wrong in attempting to theorize and give explanations of topics relating to these fundamental matters; instead, they must merely describe and be vigilant of transgressions of sense,
occasion by occasion. […] Against the backdrop of these considerations, although it is right to think of this transition as marking a shift from a focus on ‘reality’ to a greater attention to ‘human practices’, there is a real danger in understanding what this embodies in too simplistic terms and in a way that obscures the continuity in his overall method. Certainly, it is not a shift from realism to idealism, as some commentators hold (see Hutto 1996). We can better understand the nature of this shift by reminding ourselves that Wittgenstein initially held that linguistic activity was to be understood in terms of particular instances of modelling reality. This is what lay behind his view of the general form of the proposition and what drove his early views concerning the truthconditional and determinate character of all sense-making. In his later period, a more liberal, multi-functional understanding of grammar replaced the idea that the combinatorial possibilities of objects underpin the very substance of the world, and
formed the basis of a different vision of what underwrites essence. Seen in this light, it would be a mistake to regard On Certainty as marking a unique turn in Wittgenstein’s thinking, if this is meant to be constituted by a hitherto absent focus on the importance of our fundamental activities. To the extent that it is right to say he espoused foundationalism at all, it can be found even in his earliest writings.

Moyal-Sharrock, Daniele (ed.), The Third Wittgenstein: the post-Investigations works, Ashgate, 2004

Book information:
Hardback, 225 pages
ISBN 0- 7546-3024-2

Brief Discussion
This anthology aims to correct the traditional bipartite conception of Wittgenstein's work and establish the existence of a distinct and important post-Investigations Wittgenstein, a third Wittgenstein, whose third masterpiece is On Certainty. Contributions from Jacques Bouveresse, John V. Canfield, Frank Cioffi, H.-J. Glock, Laurence Goldstein, Michel ter Hark, Dan Hutto, Dale Jaquette, John Koethe, Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Jose Medina and Avrum Stroll on On Certainty, Remarks on Colour and the writings and remarks on philosophical psychology.
You can read chapters from this book in Google Books:

Stroll, Avrum, Wittgenstein, One World, 2002.

Book information:
Paperback, 162 pages
ISBN: 1-85168-293-7

Brief Discussion
This highly readable introduction to Wittgenstein outlines the substance of his philosophical ideas on the backdrop of his life. It is one of the rare, if not the only, introduction that gives equal weight and space to what it calls Wittgenstein's 'three great ideas': the Tractatus, Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty.

Moyal-Sharrock, Danièle (2001), 'The Third Wittgenstein & the Category Mistake of Philosophical Scepticism' in Wittgenstein and the Future of Philosophy. A Reassessment after 50 years, edited by R. Haller & K. Puhl (Vienna: oeb&hpt, 2002), 293-305.

Brief Description
In On Certainty, Wittgenstein comes to the realisation that our foundational certainty is not up for grabs by the sceptic because it is not an empirical candidate at all. The reason the sceptic mistakes it for one is that it has propositional doppelgänger that are up for grabs. The doppelgänger of a hinge – Wittgenstein's metaphor for a foundational certainty (OC 341) – is a sentence made up of the same words as a hinge, but which does not function as a hinge. Depending on context, an identical sentence (e.g. 'I have a body') can be used to function as a rule of grammar, an empirical proposition or a spontaneous expression. It is use that determines status, but the danger here is that the identical appearance of the sentence in each use makes it look as if we are dealing with a single status – that status usually being that of the proposition, or falsifiable description – and because in that use, we can effect a successful negation, we transfer the possibility of successful negation to all uses. This is what allows the sceptic to believe she is negating our certainty, when all she is doing is unwittingly and inconsequentially negating an empirical or fictional doppelgänger of that certainty. Philosophical scepticism turns out to be the misguided product of a category mistake.

Goldstein, Laurence, What does “Experiencing Meaning” Mean?, in D. Moyal-Sharrock (ed.), The Third Wittgenstein (London, Ashgate, 2004), pp.107-123.

Brief Discussion
It seems like a category mistake of the sort identified by Ryle and Wittgenstein to claim that meaning is something that we experience. Even some scholars who are reasonably familiar with Wittgenstein’s views are shocked to discover that, especially in the last few years of his philosophical career, he endorsed the claim. This paper discusses the (sometimes apparently nutty) things he has to say on aspects of the meaning experience such as feeling the meaning of a word slipping away when it is repeated several times, seeing Tuesday as thin and Wednesday as fat, sensing the switch of meaning when one notices an ambiguity, meaning-blindness. Some consideration is given to the relevance of the experience of meaning to poetry, humour and meaning something one way rather than another.

Addis, Mark, Wittgenstein: A Guide for the Perplexed, Continuum, 2006.

Book information:
Hardback, 192 pages
ISBN: 0-8264-8495-6 (hbk); 0-8264-8496-4 (pbk)

Brief Discussion
The book is an authoritative, comprehensive and lucid commentary on the philosophy of this eminent modern thinker. It offers sound guidance to reading Wittgenstein and a valuable methodology for interpreting his works. The illuminating text covers the entirety of Wittgenstein's thought, examining the relationship between the early, middle and late periods of his philosophy. Detailed attention is paid to Wittgenstein's the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations, as well as to other published writings.
Valuably, the guide also covers ground not commonly explored in studies of Wittgenstein, including his contributions to aesthetics and philosophy of religion.

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